Category Archives: Philosophy

Ontological Catastrophe

This wonderful book is not to be missed. As a matter of fact I have been waiting for it for years!

My foray into the world of Slavoj Žižek started when I first watched this video a while ago. This is a video of a 2003 TV program, where Rudnev and Aronson, two Russian philosophers discuss Wittgenstein. Towards the end of it (one minute before it ends, actually), Rudnev regrets that they don’t have time to address modern philosophy and says, that for him, the only contemporary who can be read today with interest is Slavoj Žižek. Aronson laughs, calling Žižek “re-teller”, Rudnev is slightly embarrassed and retorts defensively, that today the only way for philosophy is eclecticism.

At this point I realized, that it was time to start reading Žižek seriously. Until then I only glanced through one or two of his political articles and did not think I would pursue it any further as I was horrified (and still am) by his political views. As a matter of fact I have rarely encountered anything insulting common sense more than Žižek’s political views. Perhaps Chomsky’s political views. However, a man’s politics (and movie criticism) and his philosophy are completely different things and should be separated.

Ever since picking up Less than Nothing (which in and of itself may be considered quite an endeavor since the hard cover volume is pretty heavy), I was completely assimilated into the Žižek camp. Naturally, this required reading Lacan, which among other things made me doubt command of the French language: his or mine, I was not sure, but it was excruciating. Lacan is more of a talker than a writer.

Since I traveled the whole route zigzagging from Less than Nothing to earlier works, to political works, to Absolute Recoil, I had a benefit of watching how Žižek’s philosophical personality (subject) was born in the future and made its way to the past, defining its own presuppositions. Earlier works can now be perceived as “future anterior”, from the point of view of the later ones. And always, two lingering questions remained: 1. So, where are we regarding the late Schelling and Hegel as starting points to our attempt at understanding the Real? and 2. Žižek is certainly not an eclectic or re-teller. But since he is not a system-builder of any kind either (what a heresy it would be to even think that for a second!) what is in the core of his ideas? And why is psychoanalysis so important? Yes, Lacan as a refracting device which affords a new look at Kant and Hegel is great, but why? And why, unlike Johnston, is Žižek not starting to ask “materialist” questions? And even stressing more and more, that every true materialist has to start from idealism? (Lenin rolling in his grave, I hope).

This book answers all of these questions. No spoilers here, it deserves a close reading! I also like the divergence from the quasineurscientific project of Malabou and Johnston. It is great that these intuitions are emerging now, but I do not believe neuroscience is anywhere near a level that could serve as a starting point for building an interface to psychoanalysis.

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Mythology, Madness, and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism

As we are approaching the times, where, according to some bright contemporary minds (Adrian Johnston, Catherine Malabou) to name a couple the debt of biology which according to Freud should explain psychoanalysis, is either being paid or close to it, the question of subjectivity: what is it, really, is re-surging with full force. Adrian Johnston bases his transcendental materialism on a presentation of this very problem and its solution in a couple of must-read books (1 2). There, he engages with modern thinkers on this issue (among other things).

 Mythology, Madness, and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism is a joint effort by Markus Gabriel and Slavoj Žižek, where the issues are tackled from a slightly different angle. Unlike Johnston, for whom, in the crudest of terms, the rise of subjectivity occurs in the register of the Lacanian Real, Gabriel would question the very “real” status of this Real to begin with. In that sense, he is much closer to Žižek, who, in The Parallax View states that the radical materialism must start with the Hegelian concept of Notion (“a truly radical materialist approach … to put it in Hegelese, there is the Particular because the Universal is not fully itself; there is the opaque material reality because the Notion is not fully itself…” Parallax View, The Comedy of Incarnation). On a personal note: I find this anti-Leninist turn most gratifying.

A great feature of this book is Žižek’s chapter on Fichte. I am not going to try and do it justice in a blog entry. Suffice it to say, that importance of Fichte’s thought is only matched by the thoroughness of misunderstanding of it. Žižek boldly battles the dragons of Fichte’s perceived solipsism. It is not that he presents a “new” understanding of Fichte’s philosophy. He presents a “real” understanding of it, reminding us once again about the platonic difference between “philosophia” and “doxophilia”. The “doxa” in this case being the basic adoption of a false reduction of Fichte’s system by Mme de Stael to a story of baron Munchausen, who pulled himself across the river by his sleeve.

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Ideology & Metaphysics

“[T]el refus du dogmatisme est la condition minimale de toute critique des idéologies, pour autant qu’une idéologie n’est pas identifiable à n’importe quelle représentation leurrante, mais a toute forme de pseudo-rationalité visant à établir que ce qui existe effectivement doit de toute nécessite exister. La critique des idéologies, qui consiste au fond toujours à démontrer qu’une situation sociale présente comme inévitable est en vérité contingente, épouse essentiellement la critique de la métaphysique, entendue comme production illusoire d’entités nécessaires. Nous n’entendons pas remettre en cause, en ce sens, la péremption contemporaine de la métaphysique. Car un tel dogmatisme, que prétend que ce Dieu, puis ce monde, puis cette Histoire, et pour finir ce régime politique actuellement effectif doit nécessairement être, et être tel qu’il est, un tel absolutisme semble bien relever d’une époque de la pensée à laquelle il n’est ni possible ni souhaitable de revenir.”

Quentin Meillassoux, Après la finitude (Seuil 2006, pp 58-59)

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Truth of the Truth of the Revolution

Dmitry Bykov in his literary lectures often mentions, that while the Russian Revolution of October 1917 was a horrible event that brought terror, annihilation of tens of millions, displacement of nations, etc, etc, the idea of the Revolution was a noble one: it was a (failed) project of the 20th century modernism to create an uebermensch. Hence in Alexandre Block’s classic The 12, Jesus Christ is floating somewhere in the midst of with the band of 12 scoundrels – the bloodthirsty revolutionary patrol.

In his lecture on Doctor Zhivago, Bykov expresses an idea that the novel contains bursts of Pasternak’s powerful irritation directed against, for instance, Jews – for not noticing the genius of Christianity, born out of their very midst, as one example. As another – Pasternak is deploring the Soviets, who brought with them the ideas of making everyone forcefully happy by introducing the “objective” laws of history into personal lives (Bykov, like Lacan, thinks that dialectical and historical materialisms are one and the same, and the distinction is indeed irrelevant for the purpose of his discourse). He further elaborates how Pasternak is raging against the revolting language of the Decrees, and, indeed, philosophy: the long-winded heavy wording reminiscent of Talmudic casuistic, earthly, devoid of any thought that could possibly take flight.

As someone who was born in Russia and raised there in the 80s, I can appreciate Pasternak’s revulsion. Life in the Soviet Union at the time had inoculated me against ever being charmed or fascinated by Marxism of any kind. If we have any hope of building a foundation for the new materialism (transcendental, for instance), we must first overcome the horrible legacy of what happened in Russia and the transformation Marx/Engels had sustained under interpretation of, arguably, most villainous characters of modern history such as Lenin or Stalin (although applying the term “villain” to these individuals evokes grotesque associations with “villain” as a dramatic persona, for it falls so short of doing justice to what they were).

Returning to the apparent contradiction in Bykov’s lectures (on one hand Revolution is a super-project to create a super-man, Jesus in the midst of this criminal mob, etc, on the other – a triumph of horrible banality and platitude, consuming everything in its way), I think, we can follow Lacan’s famous “There is no truth of the truth”. Indeed, after the first round of euphoria (floating Jesus) it became clear what the Revolution was: borrowing slightly from Ezekiel’s vision of the chariot, it could be pictured as an animal half bull and half lion, with the worst parts of each: the purely economic, stupid, consumption oriented head of the bull, and carnivorous, without conscience or remorse head of a lion. As much as we like to picture another, hidden “truth” (project of building a super-man) beneath this, we have to admit that it is no more than wishful thinking, posing as “truth of the truth”.

So, what makes us think, that it is the latter, the ugly side of the Revolution that is its truth, and not the deeply hidden project of creating an uebermensch? We should remember another Lacanian turn of phrase, (directed at analysand, but applicable nonetheless): truth always speaks directly and does not require deep hermeneutics: Moi la vérité, je parle. (I, the truth, I am talking). This means, that we can become aware of the truth by simply listening to the very language that is being spoken. No matter how the speaker may try to hide it, it is always the truth that talks. And the Revolution speaks plenty. It is the tedium of Lenin’s (not to mention Stalin’s) works, the decrees, the slogans, this inhuman language of the Soviet newspapers – openly cannibalistic with calls to exterminate the traitors of the regime “like rabid dogs” (vernacular too colorful to be reproduced in translation, especially if we keep in mind, that it was being unleashed against innocent people), in the 30s and late 40s – early 50s (times of Stalinist terror), to the bland, heavy, bureaucratic, devoid of any life of the newspapers I remember.

The truth spoke through the leaders of the USSR, who, trying to conceal their speech by replacing any talk with reading, achieved the most revealing effect. This act of suppressing speech itself betrayed them: their inability to talk was not just the sign that they were afraid to speak the truth (or indeed unable to simply talk like human beings), it was the truth talking through their loquacious silence. (One need to only remember a Galich song about a worker who was given a paper to read from at a meeting, and only too late did he realize that it was supposed to be read by a woman: “I’ve been a widow for six years now… But I’m ready to sacrifice myself to the struggle for peace.” The reaction: there was no reaction, except for praise from a high ranking Party official. Nobody listened, because the actual talk was delivered in silence).

If we listen to the language of the Revolution, we will have no problem empathizing with Yuri Zhivago’s bursting irritation. For we will be listening to the truth itself.

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Hegelian Myths

I found a section on debunking “hegelian myths” on, I think hegel.com. The myths include Hegel rejecting the law of excluded middle, his saying that we live at the end of arts, philosophy, times… And next to each myth were a few sentences explaining why it is not true.

I think such “debunking” does more harm than good. First of all only a petit bourgeois mentality would seriously engage in believing the above mentioned (by “believing” I mean taking it literally and stopping there: Hegel does say that we live at the end of philosophy, time, etc). Intellectual curiosity is precisely what would motivate a true seeker of knowledge to immerse himself in hegelian philosophy to try and answer for himself why one of the most influential thinkers in the history of mankind would allow himself the luxury of such superfluous nonsense. That would lead to many a wonderful discovery, and en route, these boring “myths” will be explicated.

It is the very attempt to dispel it that really creates this kind of drivel. Any universal thought taken out of its context and split into individual parts will display the same nature, just like in the famous tale about an elephant examined by several blind people. When sensations like “elephant is a cord”, or “elephant is a pillar” are expressed, we do not try to disprove them individually “heads on”. We just demonstrate the whole elephant and the falsehoods simply wither out and fall off. In order to do that we must also cure blindness. In this case – intellectual blindness.

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Culture, Barbarism, Žižek, Vico

In this essay, Žižek quotes Benjamin, and wonders with him:  “what if culture itself is nothing but a halt, a break, a respite, in the pursuit of barbarity?” He gives an example of how culture can be not just synonymous but identical with barbarity in Less Than Nothing, where he mentions an utterance attributed to various Nazi leaders: “When I hear the word ‘culture’ I reach for my pistol.” Here “the intended meaning was probably that he was ready to defend high German culture… against Jews and other barbarians; the true meaning, however is that he is himself a barbarian who explodes with violence when confronted with true works of culture.” (at the end of The “Magical Force” of Reversal section of Part III, Chapter 8).

In La Scienza nuouva, Vico has already intuited this position: after the “human” stage of history, comes “barbarie ritornata”, which he defines as “barbarie della riflessione” (barbarity of reflection). His evidence comes from the Middle Ages: an example of new barbarity that set in after the most enlightened teachings of Christianity were revealed. How far away are we from this intuition coming true? For one thing seems to be certain: the same symbolic framework that gives rise and supports culture in a society is also the framework of that society’s possible or existing barbarity. Take the USSR. How proud its citizens were of its ballet, arts, literature. Yet, this was the muster of a totalitarian society, suppressing its citizens with violence only matched by that of Nazi Germany (which, incidently, did not concentrate on its own citizens, not that I am defending the monstorsity of Nazism, just stressing that the monstrocity of communism belongs on a different level). So Benjamin was right: any monument to culture is simultaniously a monument to barbarity.

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Kierkegaard (Nietzsche, Schopenhauer)

These three are oddballs in philosophy and I have a hard time understanding what the big deal is. The first two whine and the last one spouts. Yet for some reason they are incessantly quoted or referred to. However if someone were to ask what was it uniquely Kierkegaardian, or Nietzschean, or even Schopenhauerian in the quote, I would really be at a loss for a definite answer. Well, maybe not Schopenhauerian. The man was a great observer, despite his sometimes embarrassing ideas.

Surely, I love Kierkegaard. It’s cool literature. Very passionate. But I fail to detect any depth in Frygt og bæven for example. These variations on Abraham’s story are perhaps inspirational in some sense, but I just do not see the book as philosophically significant. Nor do I see anything as all that significant. Yes, there is the idea of Existenz. But would Jaspers and Heidegger not have reached it on their own? What is there of Kierkegaard in either, except the word itself? For both it means something entirely different than what it means for Kierkegaard who just uses the fact that a Subject exists to more or less fetishize it. (All in good way, of course, just not really philosophically original. Yes, I interpret everything my way. Yes, study, relationship with God are among things deeply personal. Yes, I cannot make judgements about others without making judgements about myself. And so?)

Either inability to comprehend or open adversity to Hegelian ideas? Perhaps, as Jon Stewart compellingly shows, neither but just an axe to grind with Danish Hegelians.

If I were to single something of absolute importance it would be the ethical necessity in aesthetics. Or, to generalize, the importance of ethics in everything. Without that no philosophy is worth anything, and any intellectual or creative activity is worthless if it does not make us better, gentler human beings.

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Гегель, диалектика

Дядя из хорошего университета объясняет в он-лайн лекции людям гегелевскую диаликтику за 10 минут. Вот, говорит, в юности вы хотели стать космонавтом, потом немного подросли и решили стать, там, профессором – это, ребята, тезис и анти-тезис. А потом вы совсем выросли и стали парикмахером. Это – синтез. Вы, говорит, можете много таких вещей взять, отфроматировать их в тезис, антитезис, синтез и теперь вы знаете что такое гегелевская диалектика.

Это конечно же ужас. Не говорю, что Гегель был затронут лишь как необходимая веха на пути к Марксу. Маркс. Какое дикое уныние! Ну да бог с ним. Гегелевская диалектика не состит из тезиса-анти-тезиса-синтеза. Это выдумки советских марксистов ради адаптации глубины гегелевской мысли к средним умам. Диалектика у Гегеля – внутреннее свойство концепции, постоянно развивающейся в ходе своего существования. Диалектика – это то, что увидит наблюдатель, отслеживающий развитие идеи от концепции до воплощения, это и есть само описание этого движения. Взять концепцию Бытия – самая пустая, абстрактная концепция. Только пустота и абстракция собственно и есть. И все же оно всегда в основе чего-то конкретно существующего. Каким образом? В своем развитие бытие проходит через “становление” (чем-то конкретным), это самое “становление” состоит из бытия и его отрицания одновременно: для того чтобы стать “чем-то”, нужно “что-то другое” отвергнуть . Omnis determinatio est negatio (Спиноза) – всякое определение есть отрицание. Это самое становление и есть единение бытия и небытия, позволяющее прийти к конкретно существующей веще (Dasein).

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Heidegger, Buddhism.

Zizek writes, that the difference between Heidegger and Buddhism is that according to the former, Sein needs a Dasein that thinks about it, while according to the latter Sein needs nothing (goal being a complete absorption of Dasein in the Sein). Well, yes. This is like much of Zizek: really entertaining, but why would I even begin to compare Heidegger and Buddhism? I could, but the latter seems irrelevant in understanding the former. Or vice versa.

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